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Abstract. Dynamic pricing of goods in a competitive environment to maximize revenue is a natural
objective and has been a subject of research over the years. In this paper, we focus on a class of markets
exhibiting the substitutes property with sellers having divisible and replenishable goods. Depending
on the prices chosen, each seller observes a certain demand which is satisfied subject to the supply
constraint. The goal of the seller is to price her good dynamically so as to maximize her revenue. For the
static market case, when the consumer utility satisfies the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
property, we give a O(
√
T ) regret bound on the maximum loss in revenue of a seller using a modified
version of the celebrated Online Gradient Descent Algorithm by Zinkevich [18]. For a more specialized
set of consumer utilities satisfying the iso-elasticity condition, we show that when each seller uses a
regret-minimizing algorithm satisfying a certain technical property, the regret with respect to (1− α)
times optimal revenue is bounded as O(T 1/4/
√
α). We extend this result to markets with dynamic
supplies and prove a corresponding dynamic regret bound, whose guarantee deteriorates smoothly
with the inherent instability of the market. As a side-result, we also extend the previously known
convergence results of these algorithms in a general game to the dynamic setting.
1 Introduction
Internet has revolutionized the way goods are bought and sold and has in the process
created a range of new possibilities to price the goods strategically and dynamically. This
is especially true for online retail and apparel stores where the cost and effort to update
prices has become negligible. This flexibility in pricing has propelled the research in dy-
namic pricing in the last decade or so, informally defined as the study of determining
optimal selling prices in an unknown environment to optimize an objective, usually rev-
enue. Coupled with the presence of digitally available and frequently updated sales data
one may also view this as an (online) learning problem.
The inherent hurdles in dynamic pricing arise on account of lack of information. In
the context of a single good case, this could be the underlying demand function that maps
a given price to the observed demand. Indeed, this problem has been studied in several
models in literature and strong results are now known for it. However, the problem becomes
all the more challenging in a realistic setting where multiple sellers independently choose
prices for their goods and the demand observed by any single seller is a function of all the
prices. For example, some fixed seller might observe completely different demands for the
same price she uses for her items depending on the prices chosen by other sellers. Such a
seller might falsely conclude of being in a dynamic environment even when the underlying
demand function is static.
Several existing approaches for dynamic pricing assume a parametric form for the un-
derlying demand function and choose a sequence of prices to learn the individual param-
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2eters by statistical estimation. This approach is commonly referred to as “learn-and-earn"
in literature [9, 11]. It would, however, be unrealistic in the presence of multiple sellers
since that would imply learning highly nonlinear and possibly unstructured functions in
high dimensions. Instead, we view the market as a set of strategic agents (the sellers)
choosing successive actions (prices) in order to maximize their utility (revenue) and focus
on using the existing rich tool-kit of agnostic learning in game theoretic models to prove
fast convergence to optimal prices.
The advantages of an agnostic learning approach are multifold: Firstly, it does not rely
on the precise parametric form of the underlying demand function and secondly can be
easily extended to the case when the market parameters may change across rounds. The
downside, however, being that in the best case of static markets with clean parametric
representation, the algorithms might converge to optimal prices only asymptotically [10,
13]. Consequently, to measure the performance of the actions (prices) chosen by such a
learning algorithm we typically compare it to a certain benchmark sequence of actions and
the regret bound represents the loss incurred by the algorithm for not having chosen the
benchmark sequence instead. In most such algorithms, this benchmark sequence is usually
a single action that gives the maximum cumulative utility over all rounds.
We base our dynamic pricing approach on the work by Syrgkanis et al [17] where the
authors prove that in a game with multiple agents, if each agent uses a regret-minimizing
algorithm with a suitable step-size parameter and satisfying a certain technical property,
then the individual regret of each agent is bounded by O(T 1/4) where T is the total number
of rounds. Although the main result is proved in the discrete action setting, the authors
show that the same technique can be extended to agents with continuous action sets
as well. In a nutshell, these algorithms anticipate the utility vector for the forthcoming
round and choose a price such that the cumulative utility over all previous rounds and
the forthcoming one is maximized. The regret bound thus obtained holds with respect to
the single best price in hindsight and is one of the benchmarks we use to measure the
performance of our approach.
Contribution: Our contributions in this paper can be broadly divided into 3 parts:
1) In the first part, for the class of markets with gross substitutes CES utility functions,
we show that a simple modification to the Online Gradient Descent (OGD) algorithm
by Zinkevich [18] can be used to obtain a regret bound on the loss in revenue with
respect to the single best price in hindsight of order O(
√
T ). We note that CES utilities
represent a very general market model used in both economics and CS literature.
2) Following the analysis in [17] and using a smoothed revenue objective we obtain a
stronger regret bound of order O
(
T 1/4√
α
)
against a (1−α) multiplicative approximation
of the best price in hindsight. This analysis, however, holds only for the more restricted
class of iso-elastic markets.
3) In the last part, we extend the technical property introduced in [17] to the case of
dynamic regret i.e. when the performance of the algorithm is compared to a certain
3benchmark sequence. For the class of iso-elastic markets we show the existence of
learning algorithms satisfying this property and use them to prove a regret bound
of order O
(
(1 +WT )
(
T 1/4√
α
))
against a (1 − α) multiplicative approximation of the
benchmark prices. Here WT is a measure of the inherent instability of the market. As a
side result, we can use this new property in [17] to prove bounds for dynamic regret.
A key observation in this work is that if the sellers in a market are ready to let go
of a small fraction of their revenue, then they can converge to their (approximately) op-
timal prices (in static market setting) much faster (T−3/4 instead of T−1/2). This faster
convergence property is all the more desirable when the markets drift and convergence
to optimal strategy in a small number of rounds is not possible. One would then like to
achieve good performance with respect to a dynamic benchmark.
Related Work
The problem of learning an optimal pricing policy for various demand models and in-
ventory constraints has been researched extensively in the last decade. However, many
consider the problem of a single good with no competition effects. [1, 3, 4, 6, 10] study a
parametric family of demand functions and design an optimal pricing policy by estimating
the unknown parameters by standard techniques such as linear regression or maximum
likelihood estimation. [2, 9, 12] consider Bayesian and non-parametric approaches.
Closer to the theme of this paper, there has also been a considerable amount of research
about dynamic pricing in models incorporating competition, [7,8,14] being some of them.
However, most of these consider discrete choice models of demand, where a single consumer
approaches and buys a discrete bundle of goods. Moreover, they assume that every seller
has a fixed inventory level in the beginning and is not replenished during the course of
the algorithm. We, on the other hand, consider demand originating from a general mass of
consumers where when the volumes are large, the items may be considered divisible. For
a more thorough survey of the existing literature, we refer the reader to [5].
In Section 3 we consider Online Gradient Descent (OGD), first introduced by Zinkevich
[18] as the learning algorithm used by all sellers. At every time step, the learner takes a
step in the direction of the gradient observed in that round. Interestingly, the author shows
that this simple update rule achieves a regret bound of O(
√
T ). While this approach is
independent of any game-theoretic considerations Syrgkanis et al [17] showed that with
certain modified versions of this algorithm the individual regret of each player can be
brought down to O(T 1/4). The analysis is based on the learning algorithm proposed by
Rakhlin and Sridharan [15] in a different context. Informally, the algorithm is based on
the idea that if the gradient observed in the next round is predictable, then it rules out
the worst-case scenario and allows one to achieve a much better regret guarantee.
42 Static Market Model
We consider a market with n sellers, each selling a single good to a general population of
consumers. We assume that the market operates in a round-based fashion. In each round
t every seller i chooses a price pti for her good. The supply, wi, of seller i, stays the same
every round. No left-over supply from previous rounds is carried over (which is the case
for example for perishable goods). Depending on the resulting price vector pt = (pti)i, each
seller observes a certain demand for her item given by xi(pt). These observed demands
are governed by an underlying utility function of the consumers. For the purposes of this
paper (except Section 3), we assume that these utilities are “IGS" as defined below:
Definition 1 (Iso-elastic and Gross Substitutes (IGS) utility) We say that a utility
function is IGS when it satisfies the following conditions:
a) The utility function satisfies the gross substitutes property1 and the resulting de-
mand functions are continuous.
b) Increasing the price of any good i decreases the total spending on the item i.e.
pixi(p).
c) The price elasticity of good i2 for any price vector p satisfies:∣∣∣∣∂ lnxj(p)∂ ln pi
∣∣∣∣ = E ∀j ∈ [1, n]
where E > 1 is a constant.
We view this model of utilities as an approximation to the CES utilities (with the
parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) ) used in several computer science and economics literature. It is
a class of gross substitutes utility functions satisfying parts (a) and (b) in Definition 1.
Instead of a fixed constant as price elasticity, this parameter depends on the prices of all
goods i.e.
∣∣∣∂ lnxj(p)∂ ln pi ∣∣∣ = Ei(p). We use this more general class of utilities in Section 3.
In addition to the IGS utilities we make assumptions to ensure that the problem is
well defined. Specifically, the optimal revenue of any seller i for any profile p−i of prices
chosen by others is bounded in [r, R]. Intuitively, this is equivalent to saying that the set
of allowed prices and supplies are such that revenue of any seller is not arbitrarily small
or large.
We measure the performance of the pricing strategy used by the seller in terms of
regret. Formally, the regret of an algorithm after T rounds is defined as the loss with
respect to the single best action (here price) in hindsight. For example, if {rti(pi)}t denotes
the sequence of revenue functions faced by the seller i then the regret with respect to the
1 Informally, this properties implies that increasing the price of a good i does not decrease the demand of any other
good j.
2 Price elasticity is a measure of the percentage change in the quantity of a good demanded for a unit percentage
change in the price i.e. Ei(p) =
∂xj
xj
/
∂pi
pi
5r˜i(·,p−i))
p˜ipi : xi(p) = wi
Fig. 1. Log-revenue for IGS utilities
r˜i(·,p−i))
p˜ipi : xi(p) = wi
Fig. 2. Log-revenue for CES utilities
sequence of prices {pti}Tt=1 is defined as: RT =
∑
t
rti(p
∗
i )− rti(pti) where p∗i = argmax
p
∑
t
rti(p).
Analogously, one can also define dynamic regret as the regret incurred with respect to a
dynamic benchmark sequence. For example, if p∗1, p∗2 · · · p∗T is the sequence of prices against
which we measure the loss of our algorithm, then dynamic regret is defined as:
RT (p
∗
1, p
∗
2 · · · p∗T ) =
∑
t
rti(p
∗
t )− rti(pti)
Log-Revenue Objective: In this paper, we take an indirect approach to the problem of
revenue optimization by optimizing the log-revenue objective instead of the actual revenue.
The log-revenue objective is simply the plot of revenue against the price in the log-scale
defined as follows:
ln ri(p) = ln [pi min {xi(p), wi}] .
Using the definition of IGS utility functions we can derive the following straightforward
fact used directly in the rest of the paper. The proposition follows from the definition of
log-revenue function and price elasticity of demand.
Proposition 1. The gradient of the log-revenue function r˜i(p˜i) satisfies:
∂r˜i
∂p˜i
=
{
1− E for pi : xi(p) < wi
1 for pi : xi(p) ≥ wi
This proposition implies that the log-revenue function for seller i, keeping prices of all
other items fixed, is shaped as in Figure 1. It is instructive to keep this general shape in
mind as we introduce learning algorithms to optimize it in the following sections.
Notation: We shall denote vectors by bold-face letters and log of an entity by tilde, for
example, ln r = r˜. Often for ease of notation, we shall use xi to denote demand of good i
instead of xi(p) when it is clear from the context. p−i denotes the vector of prices of all
sellers excluding i. The ∇ notation denotes the gradient. All the missing proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
63 Modified OGD
In this section, we demonstrate the kind of regret bounds that can be achieved in full
generality with CES utilities (with the parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1)). As noted before, since CES
utilities do not satisfy the IGS utility model, the gradient of the log-revenue curve, 1−Ei(p),
in the case when xi(p) < wi is unknown to the seller (see in contrast Proposition 1). To
ensure that the problem is well-defined we assume that the price elasticity of demand
for any item i and any price vector p is bounded in [Emin, Emax]. We work around the
problem of unknown gradients by using a simple modification to the analysis by Zinkevich
(Theorem 1, [18]) and show that if sellers use online gradient descent (with modified
gradient feedback) as their learning algorithm on the log-revenue objective, then they can
achieve a O(
√
T ) regret bound. We start with a claim for general convex functions with
modified feedback.
Claim 1. Consider a sequence of convex functions f1, f2 · · · fT satisfying the following
condition:
g ≤ |∇ft(x)| ≤ G ∀t ∈ [T ], x ∈ X
Suppose for the action xt chosen in round t and for γ = Gg , we receive as feedback
∇gt(xt) ∈
[
∇ft(xt)
γ
, γ∇ft(xt)
]
, then the regret bound of OGD for step-size ηt = 1/
√
t is
given by RT ≤
(
γ
√
T
)
.
This property allows us to use OGD even with imperfect gradient feedback, upto a
multiplicative constant, to obtain regret bounds that are also within this same factor. Since
the exact gradient in the case when xi(p) < wi is not available to the algorithm we modify
the feedback gradient based on the demand observed,
∂r˜i
∂p˜i
=
{
1− Ei(p) ⇒ − 1, for pi : xi(p) < wi
1 ⇒ 1, for pi : xi(p) ≥ wi
(1)
i.e. we work around this problem by choosing as feedback the gradient−1 whenever xi(p) <
wi and +1 otherwise.
Theorem 2. If any player i uses OGD on the log revenue curve with ηt = t−1/2 with
the adjusted gradient feedback as in Equation 1, then the cumulative loss in revenue
of seller i is bounded as:
∑
t
rti(p
∗
i )− rti(pt) ≤ O
(
R ·max
{
Emax − 1, 1
Emin − 1
}
T 1/2
)
,
where p∗i = argmax
pi
∑
t
r˜i(pi, p
t
−i).
7Proof. Since the price elasticity of demand for any item i at any price vector p satisfies
1 < Emin < |Ei(p)| < Emax, for the case when xi(p) < wi, the gradient of log-revenue
curve satisfies:
Emin − 1 ≤
∣∣∣∣∂r˜i∂p˜i
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Emax − 1.
Using the same idea as in Claim 1, we can pretend to be using OGD on the actual log-
revenue curve with a correspondingly modified step size η′ ∈
[
(Emax − 1)η, ηEmin−1
]
. The
following bound then follows directly:∑
t
r˜i(p
∗, pt−i)− r˜i(pti, pt−i) ≤ O
(
max
{
Emax − 1, 1
Emin − 1
}
T 1/2
)
,
where p∗ = argmax
pi
∑
t
ri(pi, p
t
−i). The left-hand side of the above inequality can be further
lower bounded:∑
t
r˜i(p
∗, pt−i)− r˜i(pti, pt−i) = −
∑
t
ln
(
1 +
rti(p
t
i)− rti(p∗)
rti(p
∗)
)
≥
∑
t
rti(p
∗
i )− rti(pt)
rti(p
∗)
≥
∑
t
rti(p
∗
i )− rti(pt)
R
uunionsq
This bound serves as a benchmark and improving upon this is the main focus of our
paper. In the next section, we focus on a smaller set of IGS utility functions and show
that with specialized learning algorithms the price dynamics converge faster to an approx-
imately optimal configuration.
4 Game Theoretic Interpretation
4.1 Preliminaries
We start our investigation into this problem by observing that the revenue optimization
problem in a market (as defined in Section 2) is equivalent to agents in a game using
learning algorithms locally to optimize their utility, where this utility is a function of the
strategies of all agents in the game. Problems of this flavour have already been studied in
different game-theoretic settings but are not applicable in a black-box fashion to our prob-
lem on account of the market specific constraints. Specifically, the log-revenue objective
although concave is not smooth, an assumption used in almost all gradient-based learning
algorithms. This calls for a different approach than the ones taken in the idealized settings.
With this context in mind, we start from the result of [17], where it is proved that if
all players in a game use learning algorithms satisfying a certain technical property, called
the RVU property (See Definition 3), then the regret incurred by each individual agent
is O(T 1/4). A natural question is then: Can we use the same technique in our revenue
optimization problem in markets?
8Definition 3 (RVU property, [17]) We say that a vanishing regret algorithm satisfies
the Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities (RVU ) property with parameters α > 0
and 0 < β ≤ γ and a pair of dual norms (‖·‖ , ‖·‖∗) if its regret on any sequence of
utilities u1,u2, . . .uT is bounded as:
T∑
t=1
〈
p∗ − pt ∣∣ut〉 ≤ α + β T∑
t=1
∥∥ut − ut−1∥∥∗ − γ T∑
t=1
∥∥pt − pt−1∥∥
Although this property is defined for linear utility functions, we can extend this defi-
nition to concave utilities by using the gradient of the utility with respect to pi as proxy
for ut i.e. in the context of our problem
r˜ti(p
∗
i )− r˜ti(pti) ≤
〈
p∗ − pt
∣∣∣∣ ∂r˜i∂p˜i
〉
.
As noted in [17], the standard online learning algorithms such as Online Mirror Descent
(generalization of OGD) and Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) do not satisfy the
RVU property. However, Rakhlin and Sridharan [15] and Syrgkanis [17] et al have devel-
oped modified versions of these algorithms, namely Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) and
Optimistic FTRL (OFTRL) respectively, that do satisfy this property,
Proposition 2 (Informal, [17]). Let D denote a measure of the diameter of the de-
cision space. Then:
1. The OMD algorithm using step size η satisfies the RVU property with constants
α = D/η, β = η and γ = 1/(8η)
2. The OFTRL algorithm using step size η satisfies the RVU property with constants
α = D/η, β = η and γ = 1/(4η)
In the context of continuous games, the utility function (alternatively, the objective) of
each player should additionally satisfy some regularity conditions. For ease of presentation,
we shall refer to the player objectives satisfying these conditions as regular objectives and
are defined, in a general sense, as follows:
Definition 4 (Regular Objective) Let the strategy space of each player i be denoted
by Si ∈ Rd and the combined strategy space by S = S1 × S2 × · · ·Sn. Let w = (wi)ni=1
denote the combined strategy profile where the strategy of each player wi ∈ Si. An
objective function fi : S → R of a player i is said to be regular if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. (Concave in player strategy) For each player i and for each profile of opponent
strategies w−i, the function fi(·,w−i) is concave in wi.
2. (Lipschitz Gradient) For each player i, the gradient of the objective with respect
to i, δi(w) = ∇ifi(w) is L-Lipschitz continuous with respect to the L1-norm. i.e.
‖δi(w)− δi(y)‖∗ ≤ L · ‖w − y‖ .
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Fig. 3. Smoothed log-revenue from an analytical
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p˜iwi Xi
Cost of Smoothness
Fig. 4. Smoothed vs actual log-revenue curve
4.2 Smoothed Log-Revenue Curve
One of the foremost requirements to apply the analysis based on the RVU property is that
the utility function should be smooth, specifically, the gradient of the objective should be
L-Lipschitz continuous.3 Clearly, as seen in Figure 1, this is not the case with our log-
revenue objective. We work around this problem by using a smoothed gradient feedback.
Definition 5 (Smoothed Gradient Feedback) For any fixed seller i and price vector
p−i, we define the smoothed gradient for player i, δi,Xi(·), as follows:
δi,Xi(pi) =

1, for pi : xi(p) > wi
1− E, for pi : xi(p) < Xi
1 + E(x˜i(p)−w˜i)
w˜i−X˜i , otherwise
where Xi is a threshold parameter for seller i.
For ease of notation, we shall denote δi,Xi(pi) by simply δi when clear from context.
For purposes of analysis, we parametrize the threshold parameter of seller i as Xi = wiexp(r)
where  is a small constant and r is a lower bound on optimal revenue of seller i. Also,
henceforth we shall refer to the actual revenue curve by r˜(·) and the algorithm’s view of
smoothed revenue curve by r˜sm(·) .
Lemma 1. The smoothed revenue objective, r˜smi (p), for any seller i is regular.
4.3 Cost of Smoothness
Since our learning algorithm only uses the smoothed gradient feedback the resulting regret
bound also holds only for the smoothed view of the log-revenue curve, i.e. the optimal
3 Informally, this is required to ensure that small changes in prices do not lead to large changes in utility gradient.
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price in this smoothed view would be the price for which the smoothed gradient is zero
although this price is clearly suboptimal for the actual revenue curve. (See Figure 4).
To prove bounds with respect to the actual revenue curve we need to draw connections
between the smoothed and actual revenue for any fixed price.
Lemma 2. For any seller i and fixed p−i and for any fixed price p chosen by seller i:
0 ≤ r˜i(p,p−i) − r˜smi (p,p−i) ≤ r
Theorem 6. Suppose each seller i uses the OFTRL algorithm on the log-revenue
objective using the smoothed gradient feedback and threshold demand Xi = wiexp(r) .
Let p∗∗i = argmaxp
∑
t r˜
t
i(p) denote the optimal price in hindsight with respect to the
log-revenue objective. Then the actual loss in revenue is bounded as:
T∑
t=1
(1− R) rti(p∗∗i )− rti(pt) ≤ O
((
R2E2
r
)1/2
T 1/4
)
− RT.
Proof. Since r˜smi (pi,p−i) satisfies the regularity condition (Definition 4), if each seller uses
a learning algorithm satisfying the RVU property, then the individual regret satisfies:∑
t
r˜smi (p
∗∗
i ,p
t
−i) − r˜smi (pti,pt−i) ≤
∑
t
r˜smi (p¯
∗
i ,p
t
−i) − r˜smi (pti,pt−i)
≤
∑
t
〈
δi,Xi(p
t)
∣∣ ˜¯p∗i − p˜ti〉
where p¯∗i = argmax
p
∑
t
r˜smi (p,p
t
−i). For ease of notation, we denote δi,Xi(pt) by δti . Using
Lemma 2 to lower bound the left-hand-side above:∑
t
r˜smi (p
∗∗,pt−i) − r˜smi (pti,pt−i) ≥
∑
t
(
r˜ti(p
∗∗
i ) − r
) − r˜i(pti)
≥
∑
t
(1− ) r˜i(p∗∗i ) − r˜i(pti)
(2)
The last inequality holds since r is the lower bound on revenue. We still have to prove an
upper bound on the expression:
∑
t
〈δti | ˜¯p∗i − p˜ti〉. Since our learning algorithm satisfies the
RVU property, by Definition 3 it follows that:
RT ≤ α + β
T∑
t=1
∣∣δti − δt−1i ∣∣2 .
Since the smoothed gradient δi(p) for any seller is L-Lipschitz continuous (Lemma 4), for
L = E
2
r
we can bound
∣∣δti − δt−1i ∣∣2 as:∣∣δti − δt−1i ∣∣2 ≤ L2
(∑
j
∣∣ptj − pt−1j ∣∣
)2
≤ L2n
∑
j
∣∣ptj − pt−1j ∣∣2 .
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In addition to the fact that OFTRL satisfies the RVU property, it is also known that
the algorithm satisfies a stability property (Lemma 20, [17]) i.e.
∣∣ptj − pt−1j ∣∣ ≤ 2η where η
is the step-size parameter of the algorithm.
We can now bound the regret as: RT ≤ α + 4n2βL2η2T . Finally substituting the
RVU parameters of the algorithm (Proposition 7, [17]) α = D/η, β = η and γ = 1/4η with
η = (Ln)−1/2T−1/4 we get:
RT ≤ D/η + 4η3L2n2T = O(
√
Ln(D + 4)T 1/4).
Combining this with Equation 2 and substituting the value of L we get:
T∑
t=1
(1− ) r˜ti(p∗∗i )− r˜ti(pti) ≤ O
((
E2
r
)1/2
· T 1/4
)
Rearranging the inequality and using same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2:
∑
t
rti(p
∗∗
i )− rti(pt)
rti(p
∗∗)
≤ O
((
E2
r
)1/2
· T 1/4
)
+ 
T∑
t=1
r˜ti(p
∗∗
i )
∑
t
rti(p
∗∗
i )− rti(pt) ≤ O
((
E2R2
r
)1/2
· T 1/4
)
+ R
T∑
t=1
r˜ti(p
∗∗
i )
≤ O
((
R2E2
r
)1/2
T 1/4
)
+R
T∑
t=1
(rti(p
∗∗
i )− 1)
∑
t
(1− R) rti(p∗∗i )− rti(pt) ≤ O
((
R2E2
r
)1/2
T 1/4
)
− RT
uunionsq
Similar bounds can be shown in the case when sellers use the Optimistic Mirror Descent
(OMD) algorithm.
Remark 1. Here we compare the total revenue obtained to the total revenue with respect
to the fixed price p∗∗ = argmax
p
∑
t
r˜ti(p) i.e. the price in hindsight that optimizes the
cumulative log-revenue objective and not necessarily the revenue objective itself. We note
that since the revenue function need not be concave, it is not immediately clear how to
characterize the resulting cumulative revenue function and the price optimizing it. For this
reason, we are using the price that optimizes the cumulative log-revenue.
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5 Learning with a Dynamic Benchmark
A bound on the loss of revenue of a seller with respect to the single price p∗∗i in hindsight
is a comparatively weak benchmark. Ideally the sellers would like to choose as benchmark
the revenue-optimizing price in every round, i.e. the sequence of prices {p∗,ti }Tt=1. Such a
benchmark is however too strict to obtain meaningful regret bounds. We shall instead
focus on a more constrained sequence of benchmark prices. In what follows, we define a
class of learning algorithms whose guarantees apply to any game setting where strategic
players use regret minimization to maximize their own utility. For generality, we define
this class for any sequence of concave utility functions {uti(·)}t. In the following section,
we shall specialize this guarantee to the context of revenue optimization in markets.
Definition 7 (DRVU property) We say that a vanishing regret algorithm satisfies
the Dynamic Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities (DRVU) property with param-
eters α, ρ > 0 and 0 < β ≤ γ and a pair of dual norms (‖·‖ , ‖·‖∗), if its regret on
any sequence of utilities u1,u2, . . .uT with respect to the benchmark sequence {p∗,ti }t
is bounded as:
T∑
t=1
〈
p∗,t − pt ∣∣ut〉 ≤ α + β T∑
t=1
∥∥ut − ut−1∥∥2∗
+ ρ
T∑
t=1
∥∥p∗,t − p∗,t−1∥∥ − γ T∑
t=1
∥∥pt − pt−1∥∥ .
This definition is an extension of the RVU property. The difference is in the term
ρ
∑
t
‖p∗,t − p∗,t−1‖ that quantifies the hardness of learning with respect to a dynamic
strategy. As for the RVU property, this property is defined with respect to linear utilities
and can be extended to concave utilities by standard arguments.
Lemma 3 (Informal). The OMD algorithm, with step size η and suitably chosen
parameters, satisfies the DRVU property with constants α = D1/η, ρ = D2/η β = η
and γ = 1/(8η) for constants D1 and D2.
Using this new definition we can now extend almost all of the results in [17] to corre-
sponding results for dynamic regret. We state the following claim for concreteness.
Corollary 8 Let CT =
∑
t ‖ p∗,ti − p∗,t−1i ‖ denote the cumulative change in benchmark
strategies of player i. If all players use algorithms satisfying the DRVU property,
then the regret incurred by any player i satisfies:∑
t
uti
(
pti, p
t
−i
)− uti (p∗,ti , pt−i) ≤ O ((1 + CT )T 1/4)
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5.1 Revenue Optimization in Dynamic Markets
Dynamic Market Model: We define a dynamic market M = (M1,M2 · · ·MT ), as a se-
quence of markets with the same set of sellers and buyers, with the same nice utility
functions as in Definition 1 but with a dynamic supply vector i.e. we characterize the dy-
namicity of the market by the sequence of supply vectors w1,w2 · · ·wT . In order to achieve
a strong dynamic regret bound, we shall assume that the income elasticity parameter of
the market is equal to one. This is a standard assumption in many market models and is
also satisfied by CES utilities.
In this section, we connect the dynamic regret of any seller i to the inherent instability of
the market by choosing the sequence of equilibrium prices4 for seller i at each round as the
benchmark sequence, i.e. {peq,ti }Tt=1. Since the supply vector may change every round, the
equilibrium prices may also correspondingly change. These changes in equilibrium prices
completely capture the inherent instability of the market. For example, if the supply stays
the same every round, then this benchmark is the same as choosing the equilibrium price
in each round. On the other hand, if the supply fluctuates wildly from one round to the
next, then so do the equilibrium prices and there is no hope of achieving a sub-linear
regret bound. That is, the resulting dynamic regret bound captures the inherent market
instability. In our following theorem, we use this connection to prove a bound on dynamic
regret with respect to the cumulative change in the supplies.
Theorem 9. Let WT =
∑
t ‖w˜t − w˜t−1‖1 denote the cumulative change in the mar-
ket in terms of changes in supplies. Suppose each seller i uses the OMD algorithm
on the log-revenue function with smoothed gradient feedback and threshold demand
Xti =
wti
exp(r)
. Let {peq,ti }t denote the sequence of equilibrium prices for seller i. Then:
T∑
t=1
(1− R) rti(peq,ti )− rti(pt) ≤ O
((
R2E2
r
)1/2
· (1 +WT )T 1/4
)
6 Experimental Evaluation
We analyze the performance of our modified OGD and OMD algorithms when the con-
sumer utility functions satisfy the CES property. Although from a theoretical standpoint
we assumed that the price elasticity of the market is a constant, empirically we observed
that CES functions approximately satisfy this assumption. In our simulations, we show
that the OMD algorithm indeed performs as proved in our analysis, except for slightly
worse convergence time.
4 Informally, a (Walrasian) equilibrium in this market corresponds to the vector of prices and an allocation of items
such that no item is under- or over-demanded. Alternatively, the aggregate demand for each item is exactly equal
to its supply.
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Fig. 5. Modified OGD vs OMD
We consider the scenario with 2 items
and the value of E = 2.5. We assume that
the market is static in that each seller has
a supply of one unit every round and uses
the threshold parameter Xi = 0.9. We ob-
serve that the modified OGD algorithm
converges quickly to the neighbourhood
of the optimal price but then keeps os-
cillating around it. This is expected since
in this neighbourhood the observed gra-
dients might change abruptly. The OMD
algorithm on the other hand takes a while
before it comes close to the neighbour-
hood but once there converges to opti-
mum quickly. As described in the analy-
sis, this is precisely the reason for using the smoothed gradient feedback.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two dynamic pricing strategies based on regret-minimizing
algorithms for static markets. In contrast to a simple approach based on the modified
OGD algorithm we showed that by using specialized learning algorithms the sellers can
converge to (approximate) revenue maximizing prices. We extended the analysis of these
algorithms to dynamic markets and proved corresponding dynamic regret bounds. In the
process, we defined a property analogous to the RVU property that is satisfied by these
learning algorithms and extended their results to the case of dynamic regret.
Our regret analysis with these specialized learning algorithms depends on the assump-
tion that the underlying market is iso-elastic. We believe that extending the analysis to
cases where the price elasticity may be dynamic is an important open question. Also, to
obtain a regret bound in dynamic markets we needed the assumption of gross substitutes
utility function. Obtaining revenue guarantees for more general utility functions would be
an interesting future direction.
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APPENDIX
A Modified OGD
Claim 2. Consider a sequence of convex functions f1, f2 · · · fT satisfying the following
condition:
g ≤ |∇ft(x)| ≤ G ∀t ∈ [T ], x ∈ X
Suppose for the action xt chosen in round t and for γ = Gg , we receive as feedback
∇gt(xt) ∈
[
∇ft(xt)
γ
, γ∇ft(xt)
]
, then the regret bound of OGD for step-size ηt = 1/
√
t is
given by RT ≤
(
γ
√
T
)
.
Proof. The update rule of OGD algorithm when the feedback, ∇ft(xt), is available is given
by: xt+1 = Π [xt − ηt · ∇ft(xt)] where Π(·) is the euclidean projection operator. Since we
use ∇gt(xt) instead, we would get a different sequence of decision points according to the
update step as follows:
x′t+1 = Π [x
′
t − ηt · ∇gt(x′t)]
Since ∇gt(x′t) ∈
[
∇ft
γ
, γ∇ft
]
, we can re-write the same update step as:
x′t+1 = Π [x
′
t − η′t · ∇ft(x′t)]
where η′t ∈
[
ηt
γ
, γηt
]
is such that ηt · ∇gt(xt) = η′t · ∇ft(xt), i.e. we get the same sequence of
steps by using ∇ft but with difference step size sequence. Following the same analysis as
in Zinkevich [18] and replacing ηt by η′t, the claim follows. uunionsq
B Regularity of Smoothed Revenue Objective
Lemma 4. For any seller i, the gradient of the smoothed revenue curve with threshold
demand Xi = wiexp(r) satisfies
E2
r
-Lipschitz continuity i.e.
∥∥δi(p1)− δi(p2)∥∥∗ ≤ E2r · ∥∥p˜1 − p˜2∥∥ . (3)
Proof. It is known that (Lemma 24, [17]) if for all j,
∥∥δi(p1)− δi(p2j ,p1−j)∥∥∗ ≤ E2r · ∥∥p˜1j − p˜2j∥∥
then δi(·) satisfies inequality 3. We shall first prove the case when j is equal to i.
This is equivalent to proving ∂δi(p
1)
∂p˜i
≤ E2
r
since the revenue curve is differentiable. By
observation, we note that the maximum change in smoothed gradient i.e. δi(p) occurs for
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prices when Xi ≤ xi(p) ≤ wi. This implies:∣∣∣∣∂δi(p1)∂p˜i
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂p˜i
(
1 +
E(x˜i(p)− w˜i)
w˜i − X˜i
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ Ew˜i − X˜i · ∂∂p˜i x˜i(p)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Er · −Ei(p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂δi(p1)∂p˜i
∣∣∣∣ ≤ E2r
In a similar way, we can show that the smoothed gradient of seller i is Lipschitz continuous
also with respect to the price of any other seller j, i.e. ∂δi(p
1)
∂p˜j
≤ E2
r
. Using the same
arguments as above, we get:
∂δi(p
1)
∂p˜j
≤ E
w˜i − X˜i
·
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂p˜j x˜i(p)
∣∣∣∣ .
The cross derivative term ∂x˜i(p)
∂p˜j
is exactly the cross-price elasticity of item i with respect
to item j. We shall denote it by Eij(p) and by definition of IGS utility functions is exactly
E. Therefore, ∣∣∣∣∂δi(p1)∂p˜j
∣∣∣∣ ≤ E2r .
uunionsq
Corollary 10 The smoothed revenue objective, r˜smi (p), for any seller i is regular.
The corollary follows from the fact that r˜smi (p) is concave in p˜i and Lemma 4. We will need
this fact in the next section to obtain a regret bound using smoothed gradient feedback.
C Cost of Smoothness
Lemma 5. For a fixed p−i let pi,Xi denote the price such that xi(pi,Xi ,p−i) = Xi, where
Xi =
wi
exp(r)
is the threshold demand of seller i. Then:
r˜i(p
∗
i ,p−i) − r˜i(pi,Xi ,p−i) =
E − 1
E
· r
Proof. The lemma follows directly from the following two observations:
1. For any price pi > p∗i , where p∗i is the revenue maximizing price of seller i, chosen by
seller,
r˜i(p
∗
i )− r˜i(pi) = (E − 1)(p˜i − p˜∗i ).
This follows from our assumption that the gradient of log-revenue curve for any price
pi > p
∗
i is a constant equal to −(E − 1).
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2. For p˜i,Xi and p˜∗i as defined above, the following holds:
p˜i,Xi − p˜∗i =
r
E
.
This can be shown by the following sequence of utilities.
r˜i(p
∗
i ) = r˜i(pi,Xi) + (E − 1)(p˜i,Xi − p˜∗i )
p˜∗i + w˜i = p˜i,Xi + x˜i(pi,Xi) + (E − 1)(p˜i,Xi − p˜∗i )
w˜i − x˜i(pi,Xi) = E(p˜i,Xi − p˜∗i )
Since x˜i(pi,Xi) = X˜i, it follows that
w˜i − x˜i(pi,Xi) = ln
(
wi
xi(pi,Xi)
)
= r.
The claim follows by using this in the above equality.
uunionsq
We are now ready to bound the difference between the actual revenue and the smoothed
revenue for any seller i and price pi.
Lemma 6. For any seller i and fixed p−i and for any fixed price p chosen by seller i:
0 ≤ r˜i(p,p−i) − r˜smi (p,p−i) ≤ r
Proof. The left hand-side of the inequality follows directly from our construction of
smoothed gradient. For the right-hand side we observe that the difference between the
revenue values of the two curves is maximum at p∗i . Hence, in the following, we shall focus
on bounding r˜i(p∗i ) − r˜smi (p∗i ). Note that the gradient of the smoothed revenue function
changes gradually from −(E − 1) to 1 in the price range pi,Xi to p∗i and in the worse case,
might change abruptly, i.e.
r˜smi (p
∗) ≥ r˜smi (pi,Xi) − (p˜i,Xi − p˜∗i )
≥ r˜smi (pi,Xi) −
r
E
Using Lemma 5 and using the fact that r˜smi (pi,Xi) = r˜i(pi,Xi):
r˜i(p
∗
i ) − r˜i(pi,Xi) =
E − 1
E
· r
r˜i(p
∗
i ) −
(
r˜smi (p
∗
i ) +
r
E
)
≤ E − 1
E
· r
r˜i(p
∗
i ) − r˜smi (p∗i ) ≤ r
uunionsq
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D OMD satisfies DRVU Property
Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD): Consider the following online convex optimization
problem: Let F be the convex set of actions of the learner. In each round t, the learner
chooses an action xt and observes a linear utility function ut5. The goal of the agent is to
maximize her utility, i.e.
∑
t 〈xt |ut〉. Let R be a 1-strongly convex function with respect to
some norm ‖·‖ on F . Suppose the agent has a prediction,Mt, about the forthcoming utility
vector in round t. The OMD algorithm incorporates this information into the decision
process by the following interleaved sequence:
xt = argmin
x∈F
ηt 〈x |Mt〉+DR(x,yt−1) yt = argmin
y∈F
ηt
〈
y
∣∣ut〉+DR(y,yt−1)
where DR is the Bregman divergence with respect to R and {ηt} is the sequence of step-
sizes that can be chosen adaptively.
Theorem 11 (Rakhlin and Sridharan [16]). The loss incurred by a learning agent
in round t under Optimistic Mirror Descent by choosing action xt ∈ F with respect
to any feasible strategy x∗ is upper bounded by:〈
xt − x∗,t
∣∣ut〉 ≤ ∥∥ut −Mt∥∥ ‖xt − yt‖ + 1η [DR(x∗,t,yt−1)−DR(x∗,t,yt)]
− 1
2η
[
‖xt − yt‖2 +
∥∥xt − yt−1∥∥2]
Fact 12 For any ρ > 0 and any numbers a and b: a · b ≤ ρ
2
a2 + 1
2ρ
b2.
Fact 13 For any points x,y, z ∈ F ,
DR(x, z)−DR(y, z) ≤ DF ‖x − y‖
where DF = max
a,b∈F
‖a − b‖.
Fact 14 For any points xt,xt−1,y0 ∈ F ,∑
t
∥∥xt − xt−1∥∥2 ≤ 2
(∑
t
‖xt − y0‖2 +
∥∥xt−1 − y0∥∥2
)
Theorem 15. The dynamic regret of an agent under Optimistic Mirror Descent with
Mt = u
t−1 with respect to the benchmark sequence of strategies {x∗,t}t is upper bounded
by:
RT ≤ R
η
+
DF
η
∑
t
∥∥x∗,t − x∗,t−1∥∥+ η∑
t
∥∥ut − ut−1∥∥2∗ − 18η∑
t
∥∥xt − xt−1∥∥2
where R = sup
x
DR(x,y0) and DF = max
a,b∈F
‖a − b‖.
5 For simplicity of presentation, we assume the utility function is linear
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Proof. By Theorem 11 instantiated for Mt = ut−1, we have:〈
xt − x∗,t
∣∣ut〉 ≤ ∥∥ut − ut−1∥∥ ‖xt − yt‖ + 1η [DR(x∗,t,yt−1)−DR(x∗,t,yt)]
− 1
2η
[
‖xt − yt‖2 +
∥∥xt − yt−1∥∥2]
Using Fact 12 and by choosing ρ = 2η, we can bound the first part of the expression as:∥∥ut − ut−1∥∥∗ ‖xt − yt‖ ≤ η ∥∥ut − ut−1∥∥2∗ + 14η ‖xt − yt‖2 (4)
Next, we can sum and rearrange the Bregman divergence terms to get:
T∑
t=1
DR(x∗,t,yt−1)−DR(x∗,t,yt) ≤ R +
(∑
t
DR(x∗,t,yt−1)−DR(x∗,t−1,yt−1)
)
where R = sup
x
DR(x,y0). Using Fact 13 in above inequality we get:
T∑
t=1
DR(x∗,t,yt−1)−DR(x∗,t,yt) ≤ R +
∑
t
D
∥∥x∗,t − x∗,t−1∥∥ (5)
Finally, we bound the last part of the expression using Fact 14 and observing that in OMD
algorithm we choose x0 = y0 = argmin
x
R(x).
1
4η
[
‖xt − yt‖2 +
∥∥xt − yt−1∥∥2] ≥ 18η∑
t
∥∥xt − xt−1∥∥2 .
E Revenue Optimization in Dynamic Markets
We derive here a sequence of lemmas required to prove the final theorem.
Lemma 7. Let pold, xold and pnew, xnew denote the price and the resultant demand
vectors respectively for some gross substitutes market.
(a) If pnew = pold(1 + ) then, xnew = x
old
1+
.
(b) If pnew = p
old
(1+)
then, xnew = xold(1 + ).
Proof. We only prove Part (a) here. Part (b) follows from identical steps. Note that in-
creasing the prices of all items by a factor of (1 + ) is equivalent to decreasing the income
of all buyers by the same factor. Let the income of player i be denoted by Ii. Then for any
buyer i, Inewi =
Ioldi
(1+)
. Further, for gross substitutes markets with CES utilities, it is known
that the income elasticity parameter, I , for any player is exactly equal to 1. By definition
of income elasticity:
I =
xnew−xold
xold
Inew−Iold
Iold
=
xnew−xold
xold
−
1+
= 1
Rearranging, xnew = x
old
1+
. uunionsq
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Lemma 8. Suppose the supply vector changes from wold = (wi)i to wnew = (w′i, w−i).
Let peq,old and peq,new be the equilibrium price vectors corresponding to the old and
new supply vectors respectively.
(a) If w′i = wi · (1 + ) then,
1 ≤ max
j
peq,oldj
peq,newj
≤ (1 + )
(b) If w′i =
wi
1+
then,
1 ≥ min
j
peq,oldj
peq,newj
≥ 1
1 + 
Proof. Consider the case where w′i = wi · (1 + ). To prove contradiction, assume that for
some player j,
peq,oldj
peq,newj
= z > (1 + ). By equilibrium condition,
wnewj = xj
(
peq,newj , p
eq,new
−j
)
= xj
(
peq,oldj
z
, peq,new−j
)
(a)
≥ xj
(
peq,oldj
z
,
peq,old−j
z
)
(b)
= z · xj
(
peq,old
)
= z · woldj .
(6)
The inequality (a) follows from the definition of gross substitutes markets. Equality (b)
is the direct application of Lemma 7. Since this is a contradiction, we conclude that
max
j
peq,oldj
peq,newj
≤ (1 + ).
For the lower bound suppose that for some item j,
peq,oldj
peq,newj
= z2 < 1. Then,
wnewj = xj(p
eq,new) = xj
(
peq,oldj
z2
, peq,new−j
)
(a)
≤ xj
(
peq,oldj
z2
,
peq,old−j
z2
)
(b)
= xj(p
eq,old) · z2 = woldj · z2
which is a contradiction for any z2 < 1. The inequalities (a) and (b) follow the same
reasoning as in inequality 6. This implies that for an increase in supply of item i, the price
of no item j increases and the maximum decrease in the price of any item j is at most a
factor of (1 + ). By analogous arguments, we can prove the result for the case when the
supply decreases. uunionsq
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Corollary 16 Let ‖·‖1 denote 1-norm. If the supply vector changes from wt to wt+1,
where the supply of each item may change independently then:
max
j
|p˜eq,t+1j − p˜eq,tj | ≤
∥∥w˜t+1 − w˜t∥∥
1
Proof. First note that we can re-write the result of Lemma 8 in log scale as:
max
j
|p˜eq,t+1j − p˜eq,tj | ≤ |w˜t+1i − w˜ti|,
where we assumed that the supply of only item i changed. Now, for any two supply vectors
wt+1 and wt, consider the switch from wt to wt+1 sequentially in a pre-defined order while
keeping the supplies of remaining sellers fixed during this switch. From Lemma 8, we know
that for each such intermediate step, where the supply of only item j changes, the maximum
change in equilibrium is at most |w˜t+1j − w˜tj|. The cumulative change in equilibrium can
then simply be upper bounded by the sum of these individual changes. uunionsq
Theorem 17. Let WT =
∑
t ‖w˜t − w˜t−1‖1 denote the cumulative change in the market
in terms of changes in supplies. If each seller i uses OMD algorithm on the log-
revenue function with smoothed gradient feedback and threshold demand Xti =
wti
exp(r)
.
Let {peq,ti }t denote the sequence of equilibrium prices for seller i then:
T∑
t=1
(1− R) rti(peq,ti )− rti(pt) ≤ O
((
R2E2
r
)1/2
· (1 +WT )T 1/4
)
Proof. We can obtain this bound using almost the same steps as in Theorem 6 and using
Corollary 16 to account for the cumulative change in benchmark prices. uunionsq
